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The quality of contemporary residential development, and the associated design challenge for 
house builders, are important current policy issues in England. Until recently, better-designed 
contemporary housing development was more frequently seen on smaller, more constrained urban 
or brownfield sites and more rarely on greenfield sites. Set against a significant shift in the 
prevailing planning regime during the 1990s (from greenfield development to an express policy 
emphasis on brownfield development), this paper attempts to explain this observation. Utilizing 
the concept of ‘opportunity space’, it develops a model of the role of design and the designer in 
the development process, which is then used to account for differences in the quality of 
development on greenfield and brownfield sites. It is suggested that the development of greenfield 
and brownfield sites displays significant contrasts and that, as a consequence, successful 




Until relatively recently, better-designed contemporary housing development in England was more 
frequently seen on smaller, more constrained urban, or brownfield (i.e. redevelopment), sites and 
more rarely on greenfield sites (see Figures 1–4).3 Generally of higher density and compact, 
brownfield developments tend to be well integrated with their local context and have character, 
identity, visual interest, complexity and variety. The developments are also more likely to accord 
with the principles and ideas set out in the current generation of residential design guidance (for 
example, Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR), 1998, 2000a; 
DETR & Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE), 2000; English 
Partnerships & Housing Corporation, 2000) and in books and articles by academic and other 
commentators on residential design (for example, Bentley et al., 1985; Calthorpe, 1993; Bentley, 
1999; Duany & Plater-Zyberk, 2000; Carmona, 2001; Carmona et al., 2003). By contrast, poorly 
designed housing development is more often seen on greenfield sites. Such developments consist 
largely of standard units with superficial affectations of difference (i.e. through changes of surface 
materials, details and finishes on otherwise standard units), laid out in patterns that meet basic 
highway and traffic standards but fail to consider the pedestrian experience or the third-
dimensional composition and organization of space (see Department of Transport, Local 
Government and the Regions (DTLR) & CABE, 2001; House Builders Federation (HBF) et al., 
2003). Frequently lacking ‘sense of place’, character and identity, such housing is often indifferent 
to context. 
 
1 Dr Steven Tiesdell, formerly Senior Lecturer in Public Policy in the Department of Urban Studies, University of 
Glasgow, died on 30 June 2011, after a lengthy illness. 
2 University of Glasgow – david.adams@glasgow.ac.uk 
3 In the UK it is commonly accepted that brownfield land is either derelict or vacant (Syms, 1994; Urban Task Force, 
1999; Alker et al., 2000). In this paper, the term ‘brownfield’ is used as shorthand for the concept of ‘previously 





There are necessarily two caveats to this observation. First, it must inevitably be a general 
observation that may not be true in any specific case: there are examples of poorly designed 
brownfield developments and, equally, of well-designed greenfield developments. Secondly, there 
is a major conceptual problem relating to what is meant by ‘better-designed’ and, more generally, 
by design quality, particularly if all stakeholder perspectives are to be considered (see Carmona et 
al., 2002). It is also important to distinguish between the use of better-quality materials or higher 
specifications and a more holistic consideration of design. While better-quality materials will 
directly add to the production costs, better-quality design (which may, for example, involve 
alternative layouts) does not necessarily increase production costs. Design should also be 





Figure 1. ‘Typical’ brownfield development (illustration by kind permission of John 












Figures 3 & 4 . ‘Typical’ greenfield developments (illustrations by kind permission of 
John Phillipps LDA Urban Design, London). 
 
 
Nevertheless, explaining why a discernible quality difference between ‘typical’ brownfield and 
‘typical’ greenfield developments occurs is of value because it serves to highlight the role (and 
value) of design in the development process. The design quality difference could be explained in 
different ways. Brownfield housing might, for example, be of better design quality simply because 
it is more highly priced (i.e. the average price of a brownfield unit is higher than the average price 
of a greenfield unit). While this assumes a positive correlation between house price and quality of 
design, price does not necessarily correspond with quality: brownfield development may be viable 
only if it can achieve high enough prices to cover higher production costs. 
 
This paper offers an explanation rooted in an appreciation of the land and property development 
process. It starts by developing a model of the role of design and the designer in the housing 
development process using the concept of ‘opportunity space’. Opportunity space can be seen in 
terms of ‘structure’ and ‘agency’. Agency embraces the way in which actors define and pursue their 
objectives and interests, develop strategies and take action in pursuit of those objectives. Structure 
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refers to the context within which actors behave and which, at a particular moment in time, defines 
the range of actions available to those actors. Structures, therefore, define the actor’s opportunity 
space. The model is then used to account for differences in the quality of development on 
greenfield and brownfield sites. The essential strands of the argument presented are as follows: 
 
• That land development and housing production on greenfield and brownfield sites differ 
in significant ways and that, for structural reasons, design is not a significant consideration 
in greenfield development contexts. 
• That, because greenfield and brownfield development contexts differ in significant ways, 
business strategies developed on greenfield sites cannot simply be transferred to 
brownfield sites. 
• That to undertake successful (i.e. profitable) brownfield developments, house builders 
have to develop new business strategies that, inter alia, require them to yield opportunity 
space to skilled designers as a means of both overcoming development obstacles and 
constraints (thereby containing production costs) and achieving the end values necessary 
to make development viable. 
• That the involvement of skilled designers together with the need to overcome the intrinsic 
difficulties of brownfield sites means that ‘typical’ brownfield development is often better 
designed than ‘typical’ greenfield development. 
 
The overarching conclusion is that, on brownfield sites, investment in better design is a 
development necessity rather than a development choice. 
 
The paper is in five main parts. The first part discusses residential design quality, focusing on the 
government-led campaign to increase the design quality of development, particularly of residential 
development, and the response of the house building industry. The second part sets out the shift 
during the 1990s in the UK planning regime for residential development. The third part discusses 
the role of design in the development process. The fourth part discusses major house builders’ 
traditional or conventional business strategies and, in particular, explains why these better suit the 
development of greenfield sites.4 The fifth part provides a more detailed comparison of greenfield 
and brownfield development. 
 
RESIDENTIAL DESIGN QUALITY 
 
The quality of residential development, and the associated design challenge for house builders, are 
important current policy issues in the UK. Since the late 1990s, there has been a government-led 
campaign to increase the design quality of development, particularly residential development. 
Originating under the Conservative government with the Quality in Town & Country Initiative 
(Department of the Environment (DoE), 1994, 1995), a new generation of planning guidance 
relating to the design quality of new residential environments has emerged. The key elements of 
this are Places, Streets and Movement (DETR, 1998), Planning Policy Guidance Note 3: Housing 
(DETR, 2000a) and By Design: Better Places to Live (DTLR & CABE, 2001). One of the major 




4 While there are about 18 000 house builders registered with the National House Building Council, speculative house 
building is dominated by a small number of major companies, each with an annual output of 500 units or more (Adams 
& Watkins, 2002). In 2000, there were 43 such companies in the UK. Together they accounted for almost 71% of all 
homes built by the sector (Wellings, 2001). 
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Much of this campaign has been directed at the poor quality of development on greenfield sites. 
Launching the 2000 version of Planning Policy Guidance Note 3 (PPG3), for example, the Deputy 
Prime Minister, John Prescott, claimed that this new policy approach would “radically alter the 
way in which we build new homes in this country … [and] end the wasteful, badly-located and 
poorly designed building that has gone on for the past twenty years”. Similarly, the design 
companion to PPG3, By Design: Better Places to Live (DTLR & CABE, 2001, p. 8), states that 
the “greatest challenge to current practice lies in improving the quality of the ‘anywhere, 
everywhere’ residential environments”. 
 
The first element of the new residential design advice was Places, Streets and Movement (DETR, 
1998), which contended that an over-emphasis on car and vehicular movement resulted in many 
developments having the roads designed first and the houses fitted in around them. Explicitly 
embracing the broader concepts of ‘places’ and ‘streets’, it argued that in “the making of places, it 
is not the road layout but the relationship of buildings to each other which should be paramount” 
(DETR, 1998, p. 26). 
 
Published in a new version in March 2000, PPG3 gives general guidance on planning for housing. 
By including a much greater emphasis on brownfield development and higher-density 
development, and an increased focus on design, the 2000 version of PPG3 represented a 
significant policy shift from its 1992 predecessor. The increased emphasis on design is reflected in 
the second paragraph, where, of eight overarching objectives, five directly related to aspects of 
design. Local planning authorities are specifically encouraged to create more sustainable patterns 
of development; to make more efficient use of land, to place the needs of people before ease of 
traffic movement, to seek to reduce car dependence and to promote good design in new housing 
developments. 
 
By Design: Better Places to Live (DTLR/CABE, 2001), published in September 2001, was 
preceded by another important piece of design guidance, published in May 2000: By Design: Urban 
Design in the Planning System (DETR & CABE, 2000). Both Better Places to Live and Urban 
Design in the Planning System set out a broad understanding of design as a process of making 
places. While Urban Design in the Planning System outlined a set of objectives for urban design 
with a strong emphasis on process and procedures, Better Places to Live concentrated on 
residential design advice. Acknowledging lessons from contemporary practice, it was based on a 
detailed examination of both historic and contemporary practice, from which attributes of 
successful housing were identified (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Design principles from Better Places to Live and Building for Life (HBF et al., 
2003) 
 
Key design principles set out in Better Places to Live 
• A movement framework that is safe, direct and attractive to users. 
• A rich mix of housing opportunities. 
• A sense of neighbourhood and community ownership. 
• A coherent structure of buildings, spaces, landscape and routes for movement. 
• Street layout and design appropriate to use and context. 
• Attractive and clearly defined public and private spaces. 
• Pleasant gardens and amenity spaces. 
• Convenient but unobtrusive car parking. 
• A safe and secure environment. 
• Well-planned homes that provide space and functionality. 
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• Housing that is robust and adaptable to changing requirements. 
• An environment facilitating long-term maintenance. 
• Housing designed to minimize resource consumption. 
• Well-considered detailing of buildings and space. 
 
Key design principles set out in Building for Life 
• Houses must not show backs to perimeter roads. 
• Priority should be given to housing layouts rather than roads. 
• Roads should track the line of houses. 
• Garages should be brought forward to form a continuous building line, or should be 
hidden behind properties. Space above garages should be considered for flats. 
• Pedestrian routes should be integrated into the development framework and, wherever 
possible, should be overlooked by dwellings. 
• Public and private space should be clearly defined. 
• Building style and landscaping must unite to make places. 
• Disabled access is essential to creating inclusive communities. 
 
Collectively, these documents have been instrumental in encouraging a step change in prevalent 
thinking on the quality of residential development. At the same time, the house building industry 
has become increasingly aware of a need to improve the design quality of its developments, evident 
in a series of high-profile appeals in the practitioner press and press releases by individual house 
builders, particularly following the publication of the 2000 version of PPG3. The industry’s 
growing commitment to good design was also demonstrated by the publication in April 2003 of 
Building for Life (HBF et al., 2003). The manifesto set out a series of priorities, including three 
with particular significance to this paper: that house builders should recognize design competences 
as crucial to ensuring their continued competitive advantage; that raising design standards requires 
major organizational and cultural change within house building companies; and that house builders 
should improve the process of procuring design skills (HBF et al., 2003). The manifesto concluded 
by urging house builders to commit themselves to the design principles set down in government 
planning policy and best-practice guidance and identified a set of key design principles (see Table 
1). 
 
As this shows, the design guidance and the response from house builders have tended to come 
since the latter part of the 1990s. However, prior to this, it had become apparent that brownfield 
housing development was already starting to be better designed and produced more in accordance 
with the principles set out in Better Places to Live and Building for Life compared to greenfield 
housing development. In the remainder of this paper, the authors argue that this improved design 
of brownfield development cannot be attributed simply to a desire by house builders to produce 
better designs in brownfield contexts, but must be traced to the particular physical and market 
contexts that compelled successful brownfield developers to utilize design and skilled designers as 
an integral part of their business strategies. 
 
FROM GREENFIELD TO BROWNFIELD 
 
Differential housing design quality on brownfield and greenfield sites is particularly interesting 
because of the emergence of the ‘sustainability’ agenda in the early 1990s, supplemented at the 
turn of the new century by an ‘urban renaissance’ agenda (Urban Task Force, 1999; DETR, 2000b). 
These agendas shifted the prevailing planning regime for residential development away from 
policies ensuring a regular release of greenfield land towards policies prioritizing brownfield 
development (Adams & Watkins, 2002). Until the early 1990s, there had been a relatively regular 
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release of greenfield land, i.e. a ready supply of land ripe for development and relatively free from 
problematic site constraints. In what came to be known as an ‘appeal-led’ planning system, 
developers were able to exploit inconsistencies in the planning system by making speculative 
applications for residential development on land not designated for such development, with 
sufficient expectation of receiving approval to warrant the exercise. 
 
During the 1990s, local planning authorities increasingly restricted the release of greenfield sites in 
order to prioritize brownfield sites. Combined with the introduction of a plan-led planning system 
in the early 1990s, the new development context led to changes in the business  strategies employed 
by major house builders. In contrast to their previous use of the appeal system to obtain 
permissions on sites not designated for residential development, major house builders have 
increasingly sought to influence the process at the earlier policy formulation and development 
plans stage, for example by seeking to have land use allocations changed in their favour (see Adams 
et al., 1992). 
 
DESIGN AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
 
To develop a better appreciation of the significance of design within greenfield and brownfield 
development contexts, it is necessary to explore issues of design, design quality and the role of the 
designer within the land and property development process. This is because, seen in terms of 
process and product, design issues are both embedded within development processes and emerge 
from their operation. 
 
Developers’ attitudes to, and appreciation and experience of, the role of design as a means of 
increasing end values and/or reducing production costs are particularly interesting. As a 
consequence, the impact of design on the development’s end value must be considered, since this 
is a primary driver of the development process. The developer’s return is the achieved selling price 
(i.e. end value) less the full costs of land acquisition and production. Unlike in many countries, 
major English house builders are simultaneously land developers and house builders.5 The return, 
therefore, comes in two main ways: through land development/dealing (i.e. through buying and 
selling land); and through housing production (i.e. house building). This distinction is essential to 
understanding differential design quality on greenfield and brownfield sites. 
 
Typically motivated by the prospect of reward balanced by risk, the financial challenge for 
developers can be illustrated (in admittedly simple terms) using the residual method of 
development appraisal. In the residual method, where three of four variables—selling price (or 
end value), production costs (i.e. site assembly, permissions, infrastructure, construction costs, 
professional fees and marketing, etc.) and/or the developer’s (anticipated) reward—are known or 
can be estimated, the fourth (the residual, typically the land acquisition costs) can be found. Based 
on the anticipated end value, developers can both fix the level of expected return/reward and 
estimate likely production costs. For any development, they will endeavour to trade off higher 
production costs against lower site acquisition costs. If production costs increase, then, ceteris 
paribus, to achieve the same level of reward, either the cost of the land must be reduced or the 
development’s end value must be increased. If developers cannot achieve the desired level of 
profit, they will pass on the scheme or, alternatively, may simply hold the land in a land bank—a 
strategy that will be viable while the rise in land/house prices exceeds the financial costs of doing 
 
5 In the USA, Australia and the rest of Europe, there is a greater degree of separation between land developers and 
house builders (see Ball et al., 1988; Ball, 2003). In the USA and Australia, the more common practice is for developers 
to sell serviced plots to house builders. In European countries, such as the Netherlands and Sweden, the state has 
traditionally played a larger role in land assembly and in providing serviced plots to house builders, often within the 
constraints of a masterplan specifying additional development and design requirements. 
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so in terms of interest paid or forgone. Developers also need to take account of the risk associated 
with achieving/not achieving the anticipated reward. Because capital is usually borrowed to fund 
the costs of land acquisition and production until properties are sold, interest rates are a major 




The process of designing and producing the built environment involves a variety of actors. While, 
for the purpose of analysis, development roles (for example developer, funder and user, etc.) are 
considered individually, actors often perform several roles. As noted above, major house builders 
typically combine the roles of developer and builder. The actors are connected in various ways but 
have their own objectives, motivations, resources and constraints. Each development role can be 
considered in terms of five criteria: (1) the actor’s financial objectives; (2) the duration of the actor’s 
involvement and interest in the process and product; (3) the actor’s concern with the 
development’s ability to serve its functional purpose; (4) the actor’s degree of concern with the 
development’s external appearance; and (5) the actor’s concern for the development’s relation to 
its context (see Table 2). 
 
Actors formulate strategies to achieve their objectives based on their awareness of the 
development context within which they operate and the motivations and objectives of other 
development actors. Each actor internally trades off between these five criteria. However, because 
actors have to interact with one another to achieve their objectives, the criteria must also be traded 
off between actors. Trading off between actors cannot be assumed to be an unproblematic process: 
actors will have different strengths/powers and ‘quality’ may be interpreted differently, while 
achieving better design (however defined) may not be an objective shared by all participants. 
Furthermore, the costs and benefits of any particular design feature or element—and, more 
generally, of the overall design of the development—are not neutral in their (perceived) impact on 
the different development  actors.  Higher-quality,  low-maintenance materials,  for example,  
increase  production  costs  and  reduce  long-term  occupation  costs. 
 
While such costs are borne by developers, the consequent benefits accrue to occupiers/investors. 
As shown in Table 2, supply-side actors tend to have short-term and ‘financial’ objectives (i.e. 
where the development is simply a financial commodity). Demand-side actors tend to have long-
term and ‘design’ objectives (i.e. where the development is an environmental product to be used). 
Two key issues arise from this: (1) the potential for producer–consumer ‘gaps’; and (2) the 
significance of the designer’s role within the producer side. 
 
Producer–consumer gaps. Where differing objectives and motivations are traded off between roles 
effectively played by a single actor or organization (i.e. where a single actor is developer, funder, 
investor and occupier), conflict is internalized, resulting in the most satisfactory outcome for that 
actor (subject to budget constraints). Where differing objectives and motivations have to be 
reconciled between actors (i.e. through market transactions), there is scope for a series of 
mismatches or gaps, in particular between supply-side and demand- side actors (i.e. producer–
consumer gaps). Development quality frequently falls through these gaps (Carmona et al., 2003). 
Arguably, competitive markets (and greater consumer choice) and/or public regulation (for 
example, by establishing threshold levels which all developments must achieve and/or making 
design quality a key consideration in development control procedures) serve to narrow producer–
consumer gaps. Producer–consumer gaps are, nonetheless, a structural feature of all speculative 
developments, especially since some 80% of all new homes in the UK are built speculatively.































Table 2. Motivation of development actors 
 
 Factors of motivation   
 Design issues 








































Builder Transient Profit-optimizing Low 










Represents them and 
High 
 































    
where buildings and 




Defines and forms 
part of public realm 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Carmona et al. (2003). 
*As is argued later in this paper, the developer’s interest in design may vary depending on whether it is a greenfield or brownfield development context 




Where producer–consumer gaps occur, the achievement of an appropriate balance of costs and 
benefits among all actors is critically dependent on supply- side actors being convinced that 
providing benefits will result in higher prices/ values or, at least, will enable cost recovery. If 
occupiers do not recognize the benefits of better-designed development by being prepared to pay 
higher prices/rents for it, then developers (especially) and funders (generally) are unlikely to 
provide or fund it. Yet, in the absence of effective competition, consumers may have to buy what 
is available rather than what they actually want, although this also depends on the stage of the 
market–housing cycle. Lack of sufficient competition also allows developers to produce ‘poorer’-
quality developments that serve only narrow financial purposes. While the supply side has to 
anticipate the demand side’s needs and requirements (in order to produce a marketable product), 
it also tends to produce, where possible, a product that suits suppliers’ objectives. Thus, rather 
than consumer sovereignty, there is producer sovereignty, or, at least, a situation of ‘producer 
convenience’ rather than ‘customer focus’ (Bartlett et al., 2002; Barlow & Ozaki, 2003). This 
situation gives developers considerable freedom (i.e. opportunity space) to devise business 
strategies that can exclude improving design quality.6 
 
The designer’s role. The prevalence of producer–consumer gaps in the speculative development 
process and the structural estrangement of developers (producers) from users (consumers) 
necessitate closer examination of the producer side, and particularly of the designer’s role within 
the producer side. The producer side typically consists of a number of actors, each with different 
sets of objectives, of which the designer is one. 
 
Although, in this paper, the term ‘designer’ is used as a shorthand for a ‘talented and skilled’ 
designer, it must also be recognized that the situation is considerably more nuanced than a simple 
dichotomy of designer/non-designer or even designer/design technician. Indeed, there are 
continuums of designers along a non-skilled to skilled continuum; untalented to talented; 
inexperienced to experienced; and from those who treat design as the application of a general 
formula regardless of site, market or regulatory contexts to those who treat design as a problem-
solving process where problems may be ‘fresh’, ‘novel’ or more simply ‘difficult’. 
 
Examining the designer’s role within the producer side, Bentley (1999) suggested a series of 
metaphors to describe the designer–developer relationship: ‘heroic form-giver’, ‘master and 
servant’, ‘market signals’ and ‘battlefield’. Identifying various problems with each of the first three, 
he found the battlefield metaphor most convincing. In essence, as all actors have some power, 
some degree of autonomy (because effective ‘control’ is either impossible or prohibitively 
expensive), some resources (for example expertise), value systems that may conflict with those of 
other development actors and a degree of self-interest (including incentives both to emphasize and 
to differentiate their own contributions), the battlefield metaphor suggests actors variously 
‘negotiate, plot and scheme’ with and against other development actors to achieve the design/built 
form they want. Thus, rather than a relatively anonymous structural process dominated by 
economic forces, the development process can be regarded as a highly social process in which the 
character, personality and interpersonal skills of the various actors are crucially important. 
 
In explaining his battlefield metaphor, and drawing on Giddens’s (1994) concept of structuration, 
Bentley (1999) argues that all development actors have ‘resources’ (i.e. expertise and interpersonal 
skills, etc., which the other actors want and need) and ‘rules’ by which they operate. For private-
sector developers, the rules relate to budget constraints, appropriate rewards, the amount of risk 
 
6 Closing producer–consumer gaps is a necessary but not sufficient condition of ‘good’ design. Despite responding to 
the needs of occupiers and investors, developers can exclude the needs of the general public and those of the 
community at large 
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to be incurred and the need to create a saleable product. Enforced through sanctions, such as 
bankruptcy, these rules are not optional and cannot simply be ignored. The rules can be ‘internal’ 
or ‘external’ to the actor. Internal rules are those that an actor places on him or herself; external 
constraints are those placed on the actor. 
 
Bentley (1999) argues that the various webs of rules, combined with resources that each actor 
contributes to the process, create opportunity space within which actors necessarily operate. In 
negotiating effectively, strategic advantage lies in knowing the limits of other actors’ opportunity 
space (i.e. how their opportunity spaces are structured). For developers, a key issue is the freedom 
(i.e. opportunity) they choose to give and the freedom they have to give to designers. For designers, 
it may involve knowing how far developers can be pushed. The opportunity space for design is 
therefore defined initially by ‘external’ constraints (for example, the site and its context, the 
planning policy and other regulatory frameworks and requirements, and market conditions, etc.) 
on the developer and then by the constraints that the developer places on the designer. The actual 
boundary or ‘frontier’ to the opportunity space is negotiated, fuzzy and ambiguous, dependent as 
it is on the respective negotiating abilities of the designer and the developer and the dynamics and 
precise nature of their relationship (see Bentley, 1999). 
 
Shown pictorially in Figure 5, there are three main external constraints (or structures) on the 
developer’s opportunity space (and, in turn, on the designer’s opportunity space): 
• the development site and its local context; 
• the market context, i.e. the need to create a saleable product (i.e. the need to take account 
of investor and user needs). 
• the regulatory context (regime), i.e. the need for planning/development consent, including 
the need to comply with development plan policies and any site-specific planning guidance. 
 
 
Three main external forces establish the 
developer’s opportunity space: 
• Site/context – moving towards the 
centre represents a more problematic, 
‘difficult’ or constrained site/context 
• Market context – moving towards the 
centre represents a more 
demanding/competitive market 
context (i.e. less producer sovereignty) 
• Regulatory context-  moving towards 
the centre represents a more 
demanding regulatory context. 
Collectively the three forces (structures) determine the developer’s opportunity space to carry 
out development. With the opportunity space, developers adopt strategies to achieve their 
objectives. If structures eradicate the developer’s opportunity space, then development is not 
feasible or viable at that particular point in time. 
 
The frontiers of the opportunity spaces are fixed at any particular moment in time but are 
dynamic and open to transformation by agents over time. At the micro-scale, the 
frontiers/structures are therefore best conceived as fuzzy rather than hard-edged. The model 
is also a simplification. More complex, multi-dimensional models could be imagined. 
  
 
Figure 5. Developer’s opportunity space. 
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Within their opportunity space, developers devise strategies to achieve their objectives. Within the 
developer’s opportunity space, various actors compete for their own opportunity space and devise 
strategies to achieve their objectives. For the purpose of this paper, the critical relationship is that 




Within the developer’s opportunity space, a 
number of actors (i.e. members of the 
developer’s consultant team) compete to 
establish, maintain and perhaps enlarge their 
opportunity spaces. For simplicity, this 
interaction is reduced to two key actors – the 
developer and the designer. The designer’s 
opportunity space is constrained by the same 
forces that constrain the developer’s 
opportunity space, but it is also constrained 
by how the developer filters those forces (i.e. 
the developer’s agency becomes a structure 
for the designer and vice-versa) 
 
Figure 6. Designer’s opportunity space. 
 
The developer’s brief (or programme) and the available budget (based on anticipated end values), 
both of which are based on the developer’s understanding of the development context, set the 
initial agenda and broad parameters for design. The content of such briefs is rarely cast in stone 
and usually provides the starting point for discussion and negotiation about design. Inevitably, 
there will be elements that are negotiable and others that are not. On the one hand, and depending 
on the nature of the development task, designers may be permitted a great deal of freedom to 
interpret the brief. On the other hand, the opportunity space for design may be severely 
constrained with designers merely providing a superficial ‘packaging’ or ‘styling’, either because all 
the fundamental design decisions have been made according to a pre-set formula or because the 
design task consists of laying out standard units. This occurs because there is no external sanction 
(i.e. the threat of bankruptcy or a failure to achieve planning consent) on the developer that deters 
or prevents him/her from following this course. The latter frequently results in formulaic and 
standardized designs unresponsive and unrelated to that context. Equally, the developer’s brief is 
unlikely to be entirely ‘arbitrary or capricious’, because its parameters are based on the ‘needs of 
the marketplace’ and have usually been shown to ‘work’ (Rabinowitz, 1996), although they may 
have worked within a different development context. 
 
In general, the more challenging the design task, then the greater the developer’s need to utilize 
design and the talents and skills of a designer as a means to achieve viable development. Hence, 
the more demanding the site and the greater the challenge of putting the desired development on 
that site within the available budget, the more likely a developer will be to yield opportunity space 
to the designer in order to meet the expectations/requirements of the public sector and the 
user/investor. While this presupposes the designer’s ability to respond to identified needs 
(including reconciling competing needs), such ability is at the heart of design as a problem-solving 
process (Carmona et al., 2003). 
 
To create the opportunity for better design (and, indeed, to further their own self-interest), 
designers may seek to enlarge their opportunity space by negotiating with developers. Designers 
may, for example, seek to persuade the developer that better design is in the developer’s interest, 
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through achieving a quicker or higher-value planning consent and/or higher end values/selling 
prices. Furthermore, it will be argued that ‘good’ design exploits the site’s positive features, while 
minimizing the detrimental effect of its negative features. Designers may also utilize the 
requirements/expectations of planning and public authorities to challenge the developer’s usual 
practices and, thereby, to expand the opportunity space for design. Equally, the developer may 
readily appreciate that opportunity space has to be yielded to the designer to obtain planning 
consent, overcome problematic site conditions and/or achieve a saleable product. A larger 
opportunity space for design does not, however, ipso facto result in better design. The designer 
may, for example, merely use the enlarged opportunity space to impose his or her own heroic view. 
Having developed a conceptual model of the role of design in the development process, the 
remainder of this paper uses it to explain why brownfield housing is often better designed than 
greenfield housing. It therefore next explores the UK house building industry’s conventional 
business strategies, which,  it  is  argued,  have  been  developed  primarily  to  suit  the  needs  of 
greenfield development. Now that the planning regime has changed (and with it the geographical 
context for housing development), these strategies are not easily adapted to the different challenges 
of brownfield development. 
 
THE HOUSE BUILDING INDUSTRY 
 
In any industrial sector, successful firms develop business strategies that give them competitive 
advantages in respect of prevailing market, fiscal, legislative, policy/regulatory and technological 
contexts and constraints (i.e. structures). As all firms operate within shifting contexts, this is a 
dynamic process: changes in (say) the regulatory context provoke and stimulate changes in business 
strategy and vice versa. There are also inertia and resistance to change, a time lag in adapting to 
change and periods of adjustment. 
 
By the early 1990s, the UK house building industry had become heavily dependent on the 
acquisition of large greenfield sites for the construction of relatively standardized developments. 
At that time, the business strategies adopted by major house builders, reflective as they were of 
the prevailing (greenfield) development context, enabled them to gain significant operational 
advantages. Since the availability and ownership of land are significant factors in the housing 
development process, control of land ownership was a particularly important element of their 
business strategies. Based on the expectation of a regular release of greenfield land, developers 
used options and conditional contracts to operate systems of land banking to control land 
ownership and ensure its availability for development. Such methods gave significant advantages 
to larger developers able to exploit economies of scale (such as easier access to finance capital) and 
to adopt longer-term strategies of land acquisition across the business cycle. 
 
To understand why major house builders’ long-established business strategies are less suited to 
brownfield development contexts, it is useful to highlight five key differences between greenfield 
and brownfield development (see also Syms, 2001; Local Government Association, 2002). 
 
1. Size of development sites. On greenfield land, developers can benefit from the availability 
of large development sites. By contrast, as fewer large development sites are available, 
brownfield land is often available only in smaller parcels. To maintain the same scale of 
operation, developers need to acquire and develop a number of sites and/or undertake 
complex and time-consuming procedures to assemble larger development sites or, 
alternatively, produce more intensive forms of development on smaller plots. 
 
2. Patterns of land ownership. On greenfield sites, the land is often available in large parcels 
in single ownership (or, at least, with a small number of owners) so that land assembly 
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becomes unproblematic. By contrast, brownfield sites often have fragmented land 
ownership, restricting development to smaller sites or for consuming considerable time in 
assembling land into suitable development parcels, especially where compulsory purchase 
orders are needed. 
 
3. Landowners’ willingness to permit options and/or conditional contracts. For greenfield 
developments, developers can usually use options and/or conditional contracts to hold the 
land, allowing house builders lengthy periods of time to bargain with local planning 
authorities. By contrast, as landowners in brownfield locations are often less willing to 
accept options/conditional contracts, developers have to risk freehold purchase. 
Developers, therefore, have less opportunity to build up land banks and have to be more 
willing to take the risk of freehold purchase prior to planning permission or alternatively 
be more prepared to work within the adopted planning framework. Once developers have 
purchased the freehold, there is a financial imperative to undertake development quickly. 
 
4. Contamination. On greenfield sites the probability of contaminated land is low. With its 
history of previous uses and its higher risk of contamination (and therefore increased 
costs), brownfield land often involves abnormal site preparation costs, making 
development appraisal an even more uncertain exercise. In addition, brownfield 
development often needs to integrate the remediation and design processes (for example, 
‘hot spots’ of contamination may affect layouts). The costs of cleaning up the land may 
make brownfield development more expensive than greenfield development, which, in 
turn, may lead to a need for higher-density development to achieve sufficient end value. 
 
5. Source of profits. On greenfield sites, developers have traditionally been able to benefit 
from increases in the value of the land, with profits/surpluses coming from both house 
building (i.e. housing production) and increases in the value of land (i.e. land 
development/dealing). This is because the process of residential development from land 
acquisition to sales of completed properties is usually a lengthy one that has often 
coincided with significant periods of house and land price inflation. Thus, cushioned by 
the increase in the land value, major house builders have not had to generate gains solely 
through housing production and, in periods of high inflation, have been able to earn a 
greater proportion of their returns through increases in land value than directly through 
housing production. Barlow (1999, p. 23) thus claims that from the 1960s until the late 
1980s major house builders’ main business strategy was “focused on capturing inflationary 
gains from housing and land markets”. Since the uncertain nature of brownfield land 
markets makes land banking a less attractive strategy, developers are less likely to benefit 
from medium-term inflationary increases in land value to the same extent as on greenfield 
land. 
 
For these reasons, brownfield development cannot be seen as a mere geographical expansion of 
greenfield development since it presents an intrinsically different market/development context 
(see Table 3). Moreover, the changing regulatory context has turned some of the strengths of the 
major house builders’ long-established business strategies into weaknesses. As Adams & Watkins 
(2002, p. 131) note, while the prevailing greenfield development context advantaged larger house 
builders, it also “generated an undue reliance on inflationary increases in land value as a source of 
profitability”. Less likely to benefit from inflationary increases in land value to the same extent, on 
brownfield sites developers have had to derive a greater proportion of profit making directly from 
housing production, in which—as can be inferred from the above—major house builders need to 
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develop expertise.7 Furthermore, while major house builders have considerable experience of, and 
expertise in, greenfield contexts, brownfield contexts remained a relatively unknown arena for 
them. In practice, specialist firms and subsidiaries of larger firms have undertaken most brownfield 
development, especially the initial, pioneering developments, and have—in the process—
developed approaches better suited to brownfield development contexts. Only three—Barratt, 
Bellway and Berkeley—of the 14 volume house builders in business in 2000,8 for example, could 
be considered to be at the forefront of urban residential development. The argument is advanced 
in the next section that to be successful in brownfield development, house builders have had to 
yield opportunity space to designers. 
 
Table 3. Major house builders’ business strategies 
 
Greenfield development context 
(policy context post-1990) 
Brownfield development context 
(policy context post-1990) 
• Major house builders control land 
through strategies of land banking, which 
crowd out smaller players (by increasing 
entry costs) and lead to (local) monopoly 
situations. 
• Developers   benefit   from   availability   
of large developments sites. 
• Land assembly often unproblematic as 
land usually  in  large  parcels  in  single  
ownership. 
• Lower risk of contaminated land. 
• Profits/surpluses   come   both   from   
land dealing and housing production. 
• Major house builders have been 
established to  build greenfield housing, 
with staff having developed expertise in 
greenfield housing. 
• All  developers  have  fewer  
opportunities  to land banks. 
• Fewer large development sites available. 
• As land is typically available only in 
smaller land parcels, suitable development 
sites often have fragmented land 
ownerships, needing time-consuming and 
complex site assembly procedures. 
• Higher risk of contaminated land (and 
therefore increased costs).  
• As   brownfield   developers   are   
unlikely   to benefit from increases in 
value of land in same way, greater 
proportion of return has to come from 
house building. 
• Major  house  builders  not  set  up  to  
build brownfield housing. Development 




THE DESIGN CHALLENGE OF BROWNFIELD DEVELOPMENT CONTEXTS 
 
The issues set out in the previous section provide the background for the final part of this paper, 
which looks in more detail at: (1) the different constraints, problems and challenges of greenfield 
and brownfield housing development; (2) the necessity in brownfield development contexts for 
more fundamental considerations of design as a means of achieving a saleable product; and (3) the 




7 In other European countries, where there is a greater separation between developers and builders, the house building 
industry has been compelled to concentrate on productivity gains and cost savings as the basis for enhanced corporate 
profitability (Adams & Watkins, 2002; see also Gibb, 1999). 
8 A volume house builder is usually defined as one completing an average of 2000 or more dwellings each year (Adams 
& Watkins, 2002). 
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Table 4. Greenfield and brownfield development 
 
Greenfield development context 
(policy context post-1990) 
Brownfield development context 
(policy context post-1990) 
• Low site preparation costs permit 
lower-density development (achieving 
acceptable residential amenity in 
lower-density development inherently 
easier).  
• Can create and ‘control’ local context: 
reduces potential for negative spillover 
effects to be dealt with through 
physical design strategies. 
• Site and context are typically ‘pure’ 
and straightforward, hence urban 
design is a relatively unimportant 
consideration. 
• Economies of scale largely gained 
through ability to utilize techniques 
and practices of standardization. 
• Standardization of house types and 
components (e.g. standardized 
products for standardized locations). 
• Interest in design does not extend 
much beyond ‘kerb appeal’. 
• Often able to build at low density, 
with space for cars and gardens: 
supposedly in tune with consumer 
preferences, thereby reducing 
development risk. 
• Created by planning system and 
developers’ land acquisition strategies, 
locational monopolies (e.g. only one 
developer on or near site) widen 
producer–consumer gap and foster 
conditions of greater producer 
sovereignty. 
• Established market: more knowledge 
about and experience of consumer 
preferences. 
• Little (apparent) need for design 
innovation. 
• Mature marketing strategies to sell 
greenfield housing estates. 
 
• High site preparation costs may necessitate 
higher-density development (achieving 
acceptable residential amenity in higher-
density development inherently more 
difficult). 
• Development usually has to be integrated 
with complex urban context, increasing the 
need to deal with negative spillover effects 
through design strategies. 
• Site and context are typically complex, hence 
urban design becomes more important both 
to secure planning consent and to resolve 
difficulties of local context. 
• Usually involves the development of smaller 
sites: therefore unable to gain same 
economies of scale. 
• Typically requires greater investment in 
design/layout (e.g. need individually tailored 
products for specific locations). 
• Need to be aware of how design in its wider 
sense affects value. 
• Need to build at higher density with 
limitations on provision of car parking and 
garden sizes: conflicts with traditional 
assumptions of consumer preferences, 
thereby increasing development risk. 
• As other developments within immediate 
area, more intense local competition. Design 
becomes important means of providing 
additional quality and of product 
differentiation. Competition also narrows the 
producer–consumer gap and fosters 
conditions of greater consumer sovereignty. 
• Emerging market: less knowledge about and 
experience of consumer preferences. Design 
used as strategy to reduce development risk. 
• Inability to plant existing greenfield designs 
‘lock, stock and barrel’ in brownfield 
locations, resulting in need for (design) 
innovation. 
• Different approaches and quite different 
images needed for brownfield locations set in 






Site Constraints, Problems and Challenges 
 
Due to their inherent simplicity, greenfield sites can be developed in a formulaic and mechanistic 
manner, producing cost-efficient layouts. With a few simple rules (which usually relate to highway 
standards, such as road widths, turning circles and visibility splays), elementary formulas or even 
computer programs can be written for laying out housing developments. In principle, provided it 
is tolerably flat and free from any notable landscape features, the same set of rules can be applied 
to virtually any greenfield development site, further reducing the apparent need for a skilled 
designer. Major house builders have thus been able to employ ‘technicians’ (rather than designers) 
to ‘design’ housing layouts, using standardized layouts and house types. This may happen without 
the technician ever  visiting  the  site  and,  thereby,  without  fully  appreciating  its  problems, 
qualities, attributes and potential. Although such layouts are often entirely functional and meet all 
regulatory standards, they can rarely be described as ‘good’ designs. On greenfield sites (and in the 
absence of external sanctions against doing otherwise), developers’ strategic interest in design does 
not need to extend much beyond ‘kerb appeal’, which, in practice, may amount to little more than 
different packaging of standardized ‘boxes’. 
 
By contrast, the different constraints and opportunities of brownfield sites mean that standardized 
solutions are unlikely to suffice, which—in turn—compels house builders to be more aware of 
how fundamental (i.e. ‘deep’) design affects end values. Where the constraints and problems of 
site development are more significant (as is typically the case with brownfield development 
contexts), the need for explicit consideration of design (and, in turn, the need for a skilled designer) 
also becomes more significant. Greater attention to design provides a means of overcoming these 
obstacles and achieving a saleable development within budget constraints. Furthermore, the innate 
complexity means that, rather than giving the computer all the necessary rules to cope with that 
complexity, it is more efficient to employ a skilled designer to prepare a scheme for that particular 
site. Carmona (2001), for example, attributes the success of Berkeley Homes and other dynamic 
companies in the 1990s to their willingness to invest in paying well-regarded architects to design 
one-off schemes for one-off sites. Hence, one of the many challenges of brownfield development 
is the need to focus on the design of more individualized and bespoke products—at least in 
response to sites, if not also to consumers (but see below) (see Figure 7). 
 
Whereas greenfield sites usually have relatively low site acquisition and site preparation costs, the 
costs of cleaning up the land may make brownfield land more expensive than greenfield 
development, which, in turn, may lead to a need for higher-density development to achieve 
sufficient end value. By making it more difficult to achieve acceptable privacy standards, higher-
density development increases the design challenge. Hence, developers again have to yield 
opportunity space to designers. Conversely, higher-density development makes it easier to create 





Greenfield development context 
(1990s) 
Developers have a less constrained 
site, market and regulatory context, 
giving them a ‘comfortable’ 
opportunity space. Furthermore, in 
their business strategies, 
developers typically did not have 
to yield space to a skilled designer 
in order to solve difficult site 
problems, to use design to produce 
a more marketable product nor to 
compete within a more 





Developer’s opportunity space is 
squeezed from two directions (and 
is therefore represented pictorially 
as a smaller space) – from without 
by more difficult site/context and 
by a more demanding/competitive 
market context and from within by 
the need to yield opportunity space 
to a skilled designer (i.e. to solve 
difficult site conditions, to produce 
a more marketable product and/or 
to compete within a more 
competitive market context, there 
is a greater  need for – and reliance 
upon – a skilled designer)    
  
 
Greenfield development context 
Post 2000 version of PPG 
While other features may also have 
changed for the developer’s 
opportunity space, following the 
publication of the 2000 version of 
PPG3, the regulatory context has 
become more demanding, which, 
in turn, has reduced the size of the 
developer’s opportunity space and 
within that (smaller) space, the 
developer also has to yield 
opportunity space to a skilled 
designer. 
 




While the planning policy context for greenfield development has been relatively uncomplicated 
(certainly until the 2000 version of PPG3), the planning policy context for brownfield development 
is intrinsically more complex. Local planning authorities may, for example, require an element of 
mixed-use development as a condition of planning consent, creating additional design challenges. 
Furthermore, rather than incurring the time and costs of challenging planning policy, developers 
on brownfield sites may need to be more prepared to work within the grain of existing planning 
policy, thereby accepting additional external constraints on their opportunity space. Although there 
has been a new generation of planning guidance in recent years relating to the design quality of 
new residential environments, local planning authorities must struggle to escape from being 
‘prisoners of their own history’ regarding the quality of greenfield housing development. Having 
already permitted poorly designed developments on greenfield sites, they find it difficult to 
encourage developers to make the necessary step change in the quality of subsequent development. 
By contrast, as brownfield development is a relatively recent phenomenon, local planning 
authorities have been able to insist on higher design quality from the start. Higher expectations of 
design quality by the local planning authority both constrains the developer’s opportunity space 
and compels developers to yield opportunity space to designers. 
 
Achieving a Saleable Product 
 
Developers do not simply have to overcome site constraints, but must do so in ways that produce 
a saleable product (i.e. one that is attractive and affordable to a sufficient segment of the house 
buying public). In general terms, development on greenfield sites can create and ‘control’ local 
context, reducing the need to address negative spillover effects through physical design strategies. 
Hence, design, as a means of resolving the difficulties of the local context, is not a significant 
consideration for developers on greenfield sites. On brownfield sites, the development usually has 
to be integrated within a more complex, ‘urban’ context with a much higher likelihood of negative 
spillover effects to be militated through physical design strategies. Viewing design as a means of 
overcoming obstacles and achieving a saleable product, brownfield developers are again compelled 
both to employ skilled designers and to yield opportunity space to them. 
 
On large greenfield sites, developers can gain economies of scale through standardization. Because 
there may be fewer constraints and problematic perimeter (‘edge’) site features, larger sites are 
usually easier to develop through standardized layouts: it is only at the perimeter that a standard 
layout has to be modified to accommodate the context. The benefits of standardization include 
facilitating construction by a low-skilled workforce, enabling central purchasing of components, 
and limiting design costs both directly and indirectly through blanket building control approval. 
Furthermore, by using ‘tried and trusted’ products, house builders are able to reduce risks by more 
accurate cost forecasting at the development appraisal stage (and later) and by reliance on designs 
known to have sold well in the past (see Hooper & Nicol, 1999). 
 
By contrast, brownfield development usually involves the development of smaller sites (i.e. where 
‘edge’ conditions become more significant), typically requiring greater investment in design/layout. 
The need for individually tailored products for specific locations in brownfield development 
contexts also means that developers are unable to gain the same economies of scale and risk 
reduction. Furthermore, on greenfield sites, where considerable cost benefits derive from 
standardization, there is rarely a compelling need or pressure for innovation. Major house builders 
are thus able largely to ‘free ride’ on the innovation of others (i.e. they do not need to take on the 
role of technical pioneer for the industry) (see Ball, 1999). Smaller producers, however, frequently 
need to be more innovative in order to compete. Due to the inability to take standard layouts and 
plant them ‘lock, stock and barrel’ in brownfield locations, there is often a necessity for some 
innovation. While there are different dimensions of innovation (for example technical and 
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organizational, etc.), design innovation usually suggests a need for a skilled designer (and a 
consequent yielding of opportunity space). 
 
The Competitive Milieu 
 
Not only must developers overcome site constraints and achieve a saleable product, they must also 
do so in a more competitive milieu. On greenfield sites, aided by the planning system and by their 
own strategies of land acquisition, developers can benefit from locational monopolies (for example 
only one developer on or near the site), which enlarges the developer’s opportunity space and 
ability to determine the development’s design and quality (i.e. conditions favouring producer 
sovereignty).9 By contrast, brownfield development usually involves direct competition from other 
developments within the immediate local area. Competition increases consumer sovereignty and 
reduces both producer sovereignty and the developer’s opportunity space to determine the 
development’s design and quality. 
 
On greenfield sites, there is a well-established market, with extensive knowledge of consumer  
preferences accumulated through experience of previous sales. By contrast, for most brownfield 
development, there is an emerging market with less accumulated information about consumer 
preferences. On greenfield sites, risk is attached to changing ‘successful’ designs. On brownfield 
sites, with their higher innate risk, design becomes (somewhat paradoxically) a deliberate strategy 
to reduce risk, with developers frequently having to use design as a means both of improving 
quality (as a competitive strategy) and of enabling their development to stand out (again as a 
competitive strategy). 
 
Predominantly based on images of car-based, family-oriented housing, the major house builders’ 
marketing strategies have generally evolved and matured to sell housing in greenfield development 
contexts. Quite different approaches and images are needed for brownfield developments set 
within more complex urban settings. Given that it is less family-oriented housing, brownfield 
housing choices are based more on the freedoms and opportunities of particular lifestyle choices 
than the restrictions of family commitments. Hence, standardized house designs and layouts are 
again unlikely to suffice because the greater social and economic diversity of potential urban 
purchasers is unlikely to be satisfied by a narrow and inflexible product range. It may also be argued 
that urban consumers appear to be more discerning because they are offered greater choice. As 
greater competition serves to close the producer–consumer gap by compelling developers to be 
more aware of user/investor needs (i.e. to have a greater consumer focus), another challenge of 
brownfield development is the need to focus on the design of more individualized and bespoke 
products. The need to meet such needs both constrains developers’ opportunity space and requires 
them to yield opportunity space to designers. 
 
On greenfield sites, developers are often able to build at lower densities, with space for cars and 
ample gardens—development patterns that are supposedly in tune with consumer preferences 
(and, hence, are relatively low-risk). By contrast, on brownfield sites, developers typically need to 
build at higher density with restrictions on car parking and garden size (if gardens are provided at 
all). While these factors would appear to conflict with consumer preferences, thereby increasing 
development risk, there has been a cultural shift in the attitudes of housing developers, in part 
achieved through direct experience of brownfield development. It  had previously been considered 
that  brownfield developments were unlikely to be commercially viable: fixed notions of what 
housing consumers wanted, together with sites that could not be viably developed with detached 
 
9 This situation is not always true. Larger greenfield sites are often split between—and developed by—a number of 




houses with ample parking provision and large gardens, meant that housing developers could not 
provide the product that they thought consumers wanted. Through the experience of pioneering 
developments on brownfield sites, developers have subsequently found that higher-density 
developments, with small or no gardens and with low levels of car parking provision, will generate 
sufficient end values so as to make such schemes viable. This realization has encouraged house 




This paper has developed a model of the role of design in the development process, which has 
been used to present an explanation of differential quality in the design of housing in greenfield 
and brownfield development contexts. The model and the explanation derived from it provide a 
conceptual framework from which hypotheses can be developed and tested through empirical 
research. The model is, for example, a ‘social’ one, which, inter alia, emphasizes the scope and 
potential for ethnographic research on the relations between specific designers and developers and 
about specific development projects. 
 
The model can also be employed to explain why, following the 2000 version of PPG3 (DETR, 
2000a), there is emerging evidence that the quality of greenfield development has also improved 
(see Table 7). While this paper concentrates on the physical/geographical and market (i.e. the shift 
from greenfield to brownfield) development context, it is important to acknowledge that other 
changes in the regulatory context will affect development outcomes. In  this respect, it is 
appropriate to note that, particularly as a result of the 2000 version of PPG3, the regulatory context 
for greenfield development has changed. The stronger national policy statement has both enabled 
and encouraged local planning authorities to raise their design expectations in greenfield 
development contexts. The realization is that in greenfield development contexts improvements 
in design quality are unlikely to come from the need to overcome problematic site conditions and 
constraints or, at least in the short term, from the demands of producing a saleable product. 
Instead, an external stimulus is required in the form of a more demanding regulatory regime, which 
compels the developer to yield opportunity space to a skilled designer. Two other changes are 
taking place that will affect design quality: first, the experience of brownfield development is 
feeding back into greenfield development process; and secondly, increasing numbers of local 
planning authorities are releasing a smaller number of larger allocations of greenfield land. In 
essence a means of transferring the costs of infrastructure provision to developers, it also changes 
the context for design. The sites are typically developed by a number of developers within an 
agreed masterplan created by the developers themselves, the local planning authority or a third 
party, thereby creating both a greater degree of local competition and additional design 
requirements. The masterplan is also a key regulatory tool to improve design quality. 
 
The paper’s central argument is rooted in recognition that the brownfield development context 
differs in significant ways from the greenfield development context, such that business strategies 
that have historically proved successful in greenfield contexts are both less appropriate for and less 
successful in brownfield contexts. The significant changes in the development context for house 
building since the early 1990s have provoked a need for strategic learning by major house builders 
in order to develop new business strategies, and perhaps also core competencies (see Adams, 
2004), that better suit the new development context. Brownfield development contexts typically 
are, for example, inherently more challenging, local housing markets more competitive and urban 
house buyers more diverse and (arguably) more discerning. In essence, therefore, brownfield 
development contexts compel developers to invest in design in their business strategies, i.e. design 
must be utilized as a means of both overcoming development obstacles and constraints (and, 
thereby, containing production costs) and achieving the end values necessary to make development 
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viable. In this regard, the paper’s essential proposition is that, if major house builders are to operate 
successfully within brownfield contexts, they must rethink and perhaps adapt their established 
business strategies—developed as they are from greenfield development contexts—in ways that 
yield greater opportunity space for designers. As the Building for Life (HBF et al., 2003) manifesto 
suggests, there is some evidence that this process has begun. The required ‘upskilling’ in design 
epitomizes the challenge now facing many major house builders, and the extent to which 
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